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Asylum vs. sovereignty in the 21st Century: How nation-state’s breach international 
law to block access to asylum 
Abstract: 
Asylum was created by the international community in the 20th century to provide legal 
protection to individuals fleeing persecution by nation states; but the ability to secure asylum 
has been fundamentally reshaped by sovereign national interests in the 21st century. This 
paper has two objectives. First it explores the various ways in which nation-states have 
adopted policies and pursued agendas which prevent asylum seekers from gaining access to 
countries of asylum, which criminalize many who enter a country of asylum and which 
frustrate their ability to obtain asylum. When state signatories breach their legal obligations to 
the Refugee Convention, the UNHCR has the authority to exercise its ‘supervisory role’ to 
bring states’ back into compliance. I examine two UNHCR interventions in the United 
Kingdom which have failed. The paper concludes by discussing how and why it is necessary 
to radically rethink national asylum and migration policies.  
 
Main text 
Asylum was created by the international community in the twentieth century to provide legal 
protection to individuals fleeing persecution by nation-states, but the ability to realize it has 
been fundamentally reshaped by sovereign national interests in the twenty-first century. As 
Arendt (1948) observed, by the end of the nineteenth century racism, imperialism and 
totalitarianism became so deeply embedded in Europe that they established the foundation for 
World War which in turn created tens of millions of refugees, displaced persons and stateless 
persons. Perhaps the first major flow of refugees was produced by the Russian Revolution of 
1917 which saw 1.5 million Russians flee. Between 1915 and 1923 one million Armenians 
fled Turkey to escape persecution and genocide. In 1947 Partition between India and Pakistan 
saw eighteen million Hindus and Muslims flee their country of origin and in 1949, following 
the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, two million Chinese fled to Taiwan and 
Hong Kong.  
One of the first acts of the United Nations was to bring into force The Refugee 
Convention (1951) which endorsed a single definition of the term “refugee” as “someone 
who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group, or political opinion” (Art. 1A.2). The Convention is underpinned by a number of 
“fundamental principles” which include the right not to be discriminated against (Art. 3), the 
right of access to a court (Art.16), the right not to be penalized for illegal entry or stay 
(Art.31) and the right not to be expelled or returned (refouler) where s/he fears a threat to 
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their life or freedom (Art. 33). Nation-states which sign the Convention are required to create 
a Refugee Status Determination system (RSD) and adopt policies which meet “minimum 
basic standards” for the treatment of refugees.  
Currently 144 countries have signed The Refugee Convention (some of whom have 
established their own refugee procedures and policies); UNHCR operates RSD in 75 
countries. Problematically the countries which conduct RSD use very different procedures 
and laws which accounts for huge differences in “due process” – i.e. the right to a fair hearing 
and the right to be treated fairly and reasonably – and in the manner in which asylum 
decisions are taken. Not only is there is a lack of transparency regarding asylum procedures 
and asylum decision-making, there are also serious questions about legal and procedural 
fairness.  
The Refugee Convention has been superseded by political events and evolving 
national policies. Among the political events which have profoundly shaped asylum policy 
are the effect of “Cold War” politics on asylum policy (Helton 1983-84), the impact of 
military dictatorship (e.g. Chile 1973-1990; Myanmar 1990-2011), war (e.g. in the Horn of 
Africa, 1974-1991), military occupation (e.g. East Timor, 1975-1999; Palestine, 1948-
present) and genocide (e.g. Rwanda, 1994) which continue to create millions of refugees.  
The institution mandated to oversee implementation of The Refugee Convention is 
the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) which is also required to find 
durable solutions – i.e. resettlement overseas, local integration or voluntary repatriation – for 
displaced persons and refugees in the Global South. In 2014 approximately 50 million people 
are living in “refugee-like” situations, a level that has not been seen since World War II.1 The 
expansion in the number of refugees together with the extent of conflict-related population 
displacement has placed increased demands upon UNHCR to provide protection, however the 
international community is increasingly refusing to provide the necessary funds (Vayrynen 
2001).
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 Donor “fatigue” has also reduced the ability and willingness of states in the South to 
shelter and integrate refugees. The net effect is that growing numbers of refugees/displaced 
persons are at risk of persecution because: (a) they reside in “permanent” refugee camps with 
little hope of resettlement/integration; (b) they fail to register as refugees and live outside 
refugee camps; and/or (c) they (illegally) transit the South in search of refuge.  
Western states are failing in their responsibilities under the Refugee Convention. 
First, given the evolution of asylum policy, the strategic focus on humanitarian and human 
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rights protection for refugees has been rejected by most states (Hathaway 1990). Second the 
universal approach to refugee protection reflected in the Convention has been “defeated by a 
Euro-centric legal mandate derived from a highly selective definition of burden sharing” (p. 
144). Finally states with their own RSD procedures have quite variable recognition rates and 
offer increasingly limited forms of protection (Eurostat 2013).  
States have also adopted a wide range of policies to prevent foreigners, including 
individuals fleeing persecution, from gaining access to their territory where they can claim 
asylum. State policies of this type include:  
 exporting/externalizing “immigration controls” to foreign countries (Boswell 2003);  
 placing responsibility on non-state actors (i.e. airlines, shipping companies, etc)  to 
prevent illegal entry;  
 establishing off-shore asylum processing to prevent individuals from physically 
entering a country (e.g. Australia’s “Pacific solution”, 2001-onwards; US processing 
of Haitians at Guantanamo, Cuba (1981-1993);  
 interdicting refugees at sea (US efforts to prevent Haitians arriving in the US, 1982-
2011; Australian interdiction, 2001, 2011-onwards; European Union/Italian 
interdiction and/or “push backs” from 1997-onwards);  
 accelerated/expedited decision-making and detention procedures to process asylum 
claims, especially claims deemed to be fraudulent (U.K. 2006-onwards (Detention 
Action 2011), Canada 2012; Central America 2014); 
 policies and procedures which block valid claims from being made by asylum 
applicants legally present in a country (e.g. reducing appeal rights, criminalizing 
“illegal” entry, introducing visa restrictions, adopting a heightened burden of proof, 
etc.; Kerwin 2011);  
 blocking access to the courts by preventing asylum claims from being filed and/or 
issuing temporary forms of protection (as in Israel; Campbell, Yaron & Hashimshony 
Yaffe 2013); 
 “readmission” agreements with migrant transit countries which allows the West to 
return (illegal) immigrants (Trauner and Kruse 2008); finally 
 migration “partnerships” with migration-transit countries to prevent/manage 
migration to Europe (Betts 2010).  
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Vandvik (2008: 28) summarizes the direction of European Union policy in the 
following way:  
With barely any legal migration routes into the EU from third countries, refugees and 
migrants are being forced into irregular means of travelling. The response of EU 
governments to these mixed flows of people has been characterized by an overriding 
effort to prevent migrants, including persons fleeing persecution, from reaching their 
frontiers and accessing asylum. In pursuing this goal, control policies have also 
become increasingly sophisticated. The EU borders have been “de-territorialized” and 
are now virtual borders, monitored through the use of advanced identification 
technologies and database.  
In 2004 the EU created Frontex to police and monitor Europe’s external borders, 
including the Mediterranean. Frontex has been at the forefront of externalizing EU border 
controls and has intercepted and “pushed back” individuals seeking to enter the EU in eastern 
Europe and an unknown number of individuals crossing the Meditteranean whose protection 
needs were not considered (Perkowski 2013). Considering its power and the resources placed 
at its disposal, Frontex has not stopped illegal entry: in 2012 it detected 72,000 illegal entries, 
a 49% decrease from 2010 (Frontex 2013: 19). 
EU states have ignored the growing number of migrant deaths in the Meditteranean in 
recent years – 3,072 persons are estimated to have died crossing the Meditteranean between 
January to September 2014
3
 – and until recently they have pursued policies to ensure that 
refugees/migrants do not reach Europe. For many years EU states have deported individuals 
on the boats which successfully navigated the Meditteranean to Italy, back to Libya. For its 
part Libya deported these individuals to their country of origin or it detained them to extort 
money for their release (Fortress Europe 2007). The indifference of Europe to the death of 
migrants who have drowned crossing the Mediterranean seemingly changed in October 2013 
when, in sight of Lampedusa, a boatload of migrants sank killing all 366 human beings on 
board.  
The incident at Lampedusa provoked Pope Francis I to declare the incident a 
‘disgrace’ which in turn led the Italian Prime Minister to launch Mare Nostrum4 (Our Sea, 
latin) using the Italian Navy to intercept and bring to shore migrants attempting to cross the 
Meditteranean. Since its inception in October 2013 approximately 150,000 individuals 
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(estimates vary) have been ‘rescued’, brought to shore and ‘processed’. An estimated 80% of 
the individuals assessed by June 2013 reportedly qualified for asylum.
5
  
However Mare Nostrum, which has come at a high financial and political price, has 
not been backed by effective action to protect the individuals who are rescued. Turning to the 
financial costs first, the operation costs Italy €9.1 million ($US 12.4 million) per month to 
finance the operation; money it claims it cannot afford. Bearing in mind the collapse of 
Italian asylum procedures which prevented other EU states from returning asylum seekers 
there under Dublin II,
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 the EU Commisioner for Home Affairs fended off requests to fund 
Mare Nostrum. Specifically the Commission said that (a) the EU will ‘not commit new funds 
to migration’, (b) ‘We don’t have the money’ and (c) that additional EU funding for Frontex 
– which appears to play no role at all in this exercise – is not possible.7 In response Italy said 
that it would stop the operation and help migrants leave for Europe – indeed tens of 
thousands have entered Europe
8
 – if financial assistance was not forthcoming.9 
The political cost of Mare Nostrum is equally worrying. Within Italy cross-party 
political support for the policy, and the government, is collapsing; the Northern League has 
accused the prime minister ‘of letting in migrants who spread diseases’.10 And within Europe 
there is prevarication and a refusal to address the issue due to indifference to what is 
happening in the Meditteranean and because of parochial political concerns about anti-
immigrant and Eurosceptic political parties which achieved electoral advances in the May 
2013 EU-wide elections.  
Italian expenditure on its woefully inadequate reception and asylum process and 
reception centres is estimated at a mere €200 million per year (this includes €44 million per 
year from the EU). The result is that reception centres, already inadequate and unable to cope 
with arrivals who arrived prior to the Lampedusa tradgedy, are unable to cope with the arrival 
of newly rescued individuals. While rescued migrants may have been registered with the 
authorities, most are not accommodated in adequate facilities and are instead left to live in 
abandoned buildings, near train stations or in markets (Bethke & Bender 2011). Indeed as 
many as 3,000 unaccompanied children have ‘vanished from foster homes and government 
shelters’ and are presumed to have become victims of forced labour and sexual exploitation, a 
situation which neither local authorities or the government have regulated or investigated.
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In October 2014, shortly before the Italian deadline for ending ‘Mare Nostrum’, the 
EU reluctantly established ‘Operation Triton’ which is to be operated by Frontex.12 However 
6 
 
it is clear that Triton will be a more limited operation: it has one-third the budget of Mare 
Nostrum and will focus on border-control not rescue operations. What is not clear, however, 
is how new EU rules on martime surveillance and migrant rights aimed at ensuring that 
migrants are rescued and provided with legal ‘protection’ will be rolled out and 
operationalized in practice (Peers 2014). While ‘push-backs’ are clearly outlawed, there are 
many ambiguities in the new rules which raise problems of accountability for Frontex and 
participating EU states. The UK’s initial response to Italian demands was to oppose any 
funding for migrant rescue operations which it said constituted a ‘pull factor’ that 
exacerbated the situation. However in the face EU-wide criticism it has backed away from 
this position.
13
 Elsewhere in the EU member states are adopting equally problematic, and 
quite possibly illegal, responses to the arrival of growing numbers of migrants.
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The United States has also sought to deter the entry of foreigners/asylum applicants 
(Kerwin 2011). Thus in addition to US Coast Guard interdiction of over 236,000 individuals 
between 1982-2011, the US has adopted security-related measures which have made it more 
difficult for individuals to access US territory, it has instituted expedited removal procedures 
for all persons who arrive without documentation and it has tightened eligibility criteria 
defining who qualifies for asylum. In addition there are specific laws which seriously 
disadvantage individuals who manage to legally enter and make an asylum claim. As Kerwin 
(2011: 1) has argued,  
… The one-year filing deadline, a heightened burden of proof, new corroboration 
requirements, and a more exclusive definition of social group membership have 
prevented large numbers of bona fide asylum seekers from prevailing in and even 
making their claims. Terrorism-related grounds of inadmissibility have led to 
exclusion of thousands of refugees and denials and delays in hundreds of asylum 
cases … The availability of legal counsel, detention, and the judge assigned to a 
removal case often influence case outcomes more than the strength of the underlying 
claim.  
The United States has also “militarized” its border with Mexico which has contributed 
to an estimated 2,238 migrants deaths between 1990 and 2012.
15
 Despite spending $US90 
billion to prevent Latin Americans from entering, the US has failed to block entry and it has 
failed to apprehend the majority of illegal aliens: the number of illegal immigrants who are 
apprehended declined from 1.4 million individuals in 2001 to 500,000 in 2011 (PBS 2011; 
7 
 
Carriquiry & Majmundar 2012: 10). Between 2005 and 2011, during when the US detained 3 
million illegal immigrants, the cost of immigration detention doubled to $US1.7 billion per 
annum.  
One measure of the extent to which EU member states have adopted policies and laws 
that deliberately target and criminalise the refugees/migrants who manage to reach their 
territory is partially reflected in UNHCR’s efforts to exercise its ‘supervisory’ role over state 
signatories to the Refugee Convention, as defined in Art. 35 of the Refugee Convention:    
1. The Contracting States undertake to co-operate with the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or any other agency of the United Nations 
which may succeed it, in the exercise of its functions, and shall in particular facilitate 
its duty of supervising the application of the provisions of this Convention. 
2. In order to enable the Office of the High Commissioner or any other agency of the 
United Nations which may succeed it, to make reports to the competent organs of the 
United Nations, the Contracting States undertake to provide them in the appropriate 
form with information and statistical data requested concerning: 
(a) The condition of refugees, 
(b) The implementation of this Convention, and 
(c) Laws, regulations and decrees which are, or may hereafter be, in force relating to 
refugees. 
UNHCR exercises its supervisory role
16
in various ways including: (a) publicly 
advising/lobbying governments about whether its policies provide ‘fair and efficient asylum 
procedures’; (b) engaging in ‘diplomatic’ discussions on government policies; (c) bringing 
diplomatic pressure to bear on a state to bring its policies into line with it’s international legal 
obligations; and (d) engaging in litigation in the courts to ‘safeguard the rights and well being 
of refugees’. 
 An examination of how UNHCR exercises its supervisory role is well beyond the 
scope of this paper, instead I look at two strands of its work in the United Kingdom, namely 
policy advocacy and litigation.
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These tasks involves substantial coordination between 
UNHCR-London, the regional and Europe offices in Brussels and UNHCRs Division of 
International Protection in Geneva. While UNHCR-London staff do their best to monitor 
national policy and asylum-related litigation, about 500 ‘concerns’ come to their attention 
each year which potentially require action.  
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 For instance following a series of public statements that the UK government would 
‘rewrite Britain's commitment to the 1951 Geneva convention on refugees in an attempt to 
reduce the number of unfounded asylum seekers reaching Britain’,18the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Ruud Lubbers, met with the British Prime Minister and Home 
Secretary in 2003. At this meeting he reminded them that the government’s obligations under 
the Refugee Convention were non-negotiable and that UNHCR was concerned that British 
asylum policy was not ‘fair and efficient’.  
The UK government subsequently issued a statement saying that it would honour its 
commitment to the Refugee Convention
19
and it established a joint initiative with UNHCR to 
monitor how the Home Office processed and decided initial asylum claims (the ‘Quality 
Initiative’ or QI). The QI consisted of a small team of UNHCR staff who monitor/audit the 
work of Home Office case owners. The team’s reports20are first forwarded privately to the 
Home Secretary for discussion and are used to agree acceptable standards and procedures 
which Home Office case owners are expected to implement. 
 Over the years many departments in the Home Office – case workers, the Country of 
Origin Information Service, the Central Interpreters Unit, the complaints unit, the detained 
fast track process at Yarlswood and Harmondsworth Immigration Centres, the Solihul ‘pilot’ 
project – have been observed and staff decisions have been audited. The QI identified the 
following problems: 
 the problematic assessment of, and decisions on, initial asylum applications;  
 the misapplication of the law – especially the Refugee Convention – in deciding 
claims;  
 a failure to read/understand country of origin information; 
 a failure to consider the European Convention on Human Rights or the UK’s Human 
Rights Act when deciding claims;  
 case owners place unreasonable expectations on asylum applicants to produce 
‘evidence’ to support their claim;  
 case owners fail to apply the benefit of the doubt where this is appropriate in 
assessing a claim; and 
 there is a consistent problem with the manner in which case owners assess the 
‘credibilty’ of applicants to establish the facts of a claim; 
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Many of the above problems have also been observed in the detained fast track, in Home 
Office decision-making on family claims as part of the UK’s Family Returns Process and 
elsewhere.  
Despite documenting extensive problems and inconsistent practices over a ten year period, 
and having secured an agreement with Ministers that case owners would adopt the standards 
agreed with UNHCR, Home Office staff have persistently failed to implement appropriate 
standards. The consistent failure of the Home Office to implement agreed standards and 
procedures is understood to arise from an apparent lack of engagement by government 
ministers with the issues identified by the QI which requires a rethink of Home Office policy 
and processes rather than the adhoc adoption of UNHCR recommendations.  
 A second way in which UNHCR exercises its supervisory role is through intervening 
(filing a legal brief or amicus curae) in asylum cases being decided in British courts; since 
1987 approximately 31 interventions have been made. Given its limited capacity to monitor 
the voluminous amount of asylum-related litigation in the UKs legal system, much less 
intervene in more than a few cases every year, UNHCR has taken the position that 
interventions should reflect important policy issues and focus on cases in the Court of 
Appeal, the Court of Sessions or the House of Lords/Supreme Court. Succesful interventions 
should establish a legal precedent in the UK and in the British Commonwealth and in 
common-law countries.
21
  
Two observations can be drawn about UNHCR litigation.
22
 First the focus of 
litigation is narrow considering the many possible issues and cases in which UNHCR could 
intervene. Second it appears that UNHCR lacks the capacity to monitor how its interventions 
impact on subsequent asylum litigation, i.e. whether and how successful litigation 
subsequently effects subsequent litigation. 
All that it is possible to do here is to look briefly at one case. The 2008 case ‘Regina 
and Asfaw’ which was heard in the House of  Lords raised concerns about  the UK’s failure 
to honor Art. 31 (1) of the Refugee Convention. Art. 31(1) states that, 
1. The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry 
or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or 
freedom was threatened in the sense of article 1, enter or are present in their territory 
without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the 
authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence. 
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2. The Contracting States shall not apply to the movements of such refugees 
restrictions other than those which are necessary and such restrictions shall only be 
applied until their status in the country is regularized or they obtain admission into 
another country. The Contracting States shall allow such refugees a reasonable period 
and all the necessary facilities to obtain admission into another country. 
Illegal entry into the UK, Europe and North America became an issue in the early 1990s 
when legislation introduced ‘carrier sanctions’ on transport operators who brought passengers 
lacking a valid visa into a country where a visa was required. Carriers were made to pay 
heavy fines, and individuals without visas were subject to criminal prosecution. Between 
1993 and 1996 approximately 555 individuals were prosecuted in the UK; many of those 
convicted were attempting to flee persecution and who did not possess a national passport or 
an entry visa (Dunstan 1998). These individuals, including persons who were subsequently 
granted asylum, were convicted of illegal entry and sentenced to varying periods of 
imprisonment. The first appeal against conviction to reach the appeal courts occurred in 1998 
– R v. Uxbridge Magistrates Court and Another, ex Parte Adimi [1999] EWHC Admin 765 – 
which allowed the appeals. The Lord Justices noted the inequities of current arrangements 
and stated that ‘both of us express a strong preference for what may be called the Secretary of 
State solution, we should expect the Respondents [the Secretary of State for the Home 
Department and the Crown Prosecution Service] to give careful consideration as to how they 
propose now to give effect to Article 31’ (¶104). The result was the creation of an ‘Art. 31 
defence’ which was incorporated into Sec. 31 of the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act and 
which was supposed to ensure that the UK was not in breach of its obligations under the 
Refugee Convention. However individuals fleeing persecution and who illegally enter the UK 
continued to be prosecuted and convicted.  
‘Regina and Asfaw’ concerned an Ethiopian national who had been imprisoned, 
tortured and raped on account of her alleged political opinions. With the help of an agent she 
fled Ethiopia by air using a false passport and arrived in the UK in an effort to transit to the 
US where she intended to claim asylum. In transit at Heathrow airport her false passport was 
detected; she was arrested, charged with two criminal counts, found guilty and sentenced to 
nine months imprisonment even though shortly after her trial the Home Secretary recognized 
her as a refugee. She appealed against the court’s decision on one point of law, namely 
 
If a defendant is charged with an offence not specified in sec. 31 (1) of the 
Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, to what extent is he entitled to rely on the 
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protections afforded by article 31 of the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees?
23
 
 The House of Lords held that Sec. 31 should not be read as limited to offences 
attributable to a refugee’s illegal entry into or presence in this country, but should provide 
immunity, if the other conditions are fulfilled, from the imposition of criminal penalties for 
offences attributable to the attempt of a refugee to leave the country in the continuing course 
of a flight from persecution even after a short stopover in transit’.24 The decision was a 
narrower interpretation of Art. 31(1) than UNHCR had argued for, nevertheless it should 
have changed the way that the British auhorities processed claims by refugees entering the 
UK on false identity papers.  
 However the Home Office has continued to arrest individuals arriving with false 
papers, and the Crown Prosecution Service has continued to prosecute and convict these 
individuals. Between 2009 and 2012 there have been 19,160 convictions for an estimated 
11,000 individuals who entered the UK illegally, though it is not clear how many of the 
individuals convicted were refugees/asylum seekers.
25
 The most recent case is that of Suhir 
Mohamed, an Eritrean who entered the UK using false identity papers in February 2014 and 
who, despite having filed an asylum claim, was convicted on 10th June 2014 in Chelmsford 
Crown Court under Sec. 31(1) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 and was sentenced 
to 18 months.
26
  
What is clear is that despite the decision in Regina and Asfaw, the Home Office and 
the Crown Prosecution Service fail to co-operate on these cases, that the Crown Prosecution 
Services does not use the Art. 31 defence and that large numbers of refugees entering the UK 
on false identity papers are convicted of a criminal offence. In short Regina and Asfaw,which 
shuld have set a legal precedent, has had no impact on the way that the British authorities 
deal with cases that raise Art. 31. It is also clear that this situation is not limited to the UK.
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Many states – Australia, Belgium, New Zealand, Germany, Britain, The Netherlands, 
Sweden and Switzerland – have adopted other policies to restrict/block asylum claims by 
individuals who have legally entered their territory. One such policy is to screen asylum 
claims to assess the applicant’s spoken language. Referred to as “Language Analysis for the 
Purpose of Determining an Applicants Country of Origin”, this policy purports to use “expert 
knowledge” to assess the spoken language of an applicant. However in Britain, and 
undoubtedly elsewhere, “the language of science operates as an illusion … to obfuscate 
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flawed assumptions about language use and capricious bureaucratic practices” in order to 
refuse asylum claims (Campbell 2013a: 686).
28
 Britain has also attempted to use isotope and 
genetic testing to determine the country of origin of an asylum applicant in a clear effort to 
block asylum applications; fortunately this policy – which has no scientific basis – has 
temporarily been thwarted (Nature 2009). 
Selective and ineffective enforcement of asylum and immigration policies, together 
with the adoption of procedures which process asylum applications with a minimum of 
judicial deliberation – as evidenced by questionable judicial decision-making in the US and 
Canada (Gorlick 2005; Ramji-Nogales et.al. 2007; Rehaag 2008) – have created a growing 
population of “failed asylum seekers” whose fate converges with that of illegal immigrants 
“in a revolving door policy, whereby mass deportations are concurrent with an overall, large 
scale, of more or less permanent importation” of cheap migrant labor (De Genova 2002: 433).  
Though states are unsure about the size of the clandestine population of illegals 
resident in their territory, they have adopted policies to prevent such persons from working 
and which subject these individuals to arrest and deportation. In the European Union it is 
estimated that the clandestine population declined to between 1.9 and 3.8 million persons 
(European Commission 2009). In contrast it is estimated that the number of illegal Hispanic 
immigrants in the US is 11.1 million. The clandestine population is composed of failed 
asylum seekers, a large number of visa-over stayers (Bigo 2009: 586) and illegal immigrants 
attracted by neo-liberal economic policies. 
Rather than address the problematic nature of asylum and immigration policies, states 
give the police wide latitude to control the presence of illegals which in turn has given rise to 
the development of hugely expensive deportation regimes. In Europe this policy has seen the 
construction of detention centres rise from 324 in 1999 to 473 in 2011 (Migroup 2013); in 
2012 an estimated 269,000 third-country nationals were subject to an obligation to leave the 
EU (a 17% increase on 2011; Frontex 2013: 44). In the US illegal immigrants are detained at 
961 sites (in 2007), and in 2010 the US “removed” 387,242 illegal migrants.  
 
Looking forward? 
The right to claim asylum has been eroded by nation-states whose policies, laws and 
procedures have made a nonsense of the supposedly “fundamental principles” of The 
Refugee Convention. Thus not only are growing numbers of individuals fleeing persecution 
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unable to find protection in the Global South, they are unable to flee elsewhere to obtain 
asylum. In effect asylum applicants are subjected to extensive forms of social and legal 
discrimination, they are increasingly denied access to asylum procedures and to the courts, 
they are heavily penalized for illegally entering a country to seek asylum, valid asylum 
claims are blocked and/or prevented from being filed and they are removed to a country 
where their life may be at risk.  
Much more could be said about the problems and difficulties confronting individuals 
fleeing persecution and who seek access to asylum. For instance I have not dealt with recent 
efforts by UNHCR to eliminate statelessness and ensure that state signatories to the two 
Statelessness Conventions put into place procedures and policies that will recognize stateless 
persons residing in their territory and legalize their status (e.g. Campbell 2013b, chap. 5).
29
  
 If we in the North cannot hermaneutically seal off and protect our part of the world 
from changes occuring elsewhere, then we had better find ways of re-engaging with the 
world. A first step is to realize that investing in ‘border management’ and other deterrance 
measures will not prevent or manage the flow of refugees and migrants seeking to enter 
Europe and the America’s: the only solution lies in sustained investment to create prosperity 
in the South. Second we need to rethink asylum and migration policies. Thus the problematic 
distinction between ‘good’ refugees and ‘bad’ economic migrants needs to be 
reconceptualized to include not merely climate-induced refugees but also the provision of 
temporary forms of admission and humanitarian assistance arising from the scale of migrant 
flows to the North. It is equally important to acknowledge the contradictory effects of 
pursuing neo-liberal economic policies in the North which simultaneously rely upon 
attracting skilled manpower and cheap, disposable/deportable migrant labour from the Global 
South.   
New asylum and migration policies are required that will make a real difference in the 
lives of the world’s poor and which will make it possible for states to support – politically 
and financially – common policies of benefit to refugees and migrants and assist the countries 
which provide them refuge. Among the steps which need to be taken include adopting asylum 
and migration policies which meet ‘minimum basic standards’ which will ensure that all 
individuals are treated fairly and reasonably, putting into place mechanisms for agreeing 
equitable ways of ‘burden sharing’, repealing policies which restrict entry to countries of 
asylum and which prevent and criminalize asylum seeking, reconceptualizing and properly 
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funding ‘migration partnerships’ to better manage migration from the global south and which 
contribute to development there. While the above issues will not be easy to address, a failure 
to address them in good time will result in a massive, uncontrollable movement of refugees 
and migrants into northern states. The policy architecture is already in place for this move, 
what is needed is the political will. 
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